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COMMENT
Keeping the Camel's Nose Out of the Tent': The
Constitutionality of N.L.R.B. Jurisdiction Over
Employees of Religious Institutions
INTRODUCTION
There is little dispute that contacts between church and state are on the
rise. 2 As religious institutions extend their participation into traditionally
secular areas such as politics, health care and business, the church becomes
more susceptible to government regulation. The regulation of religious
organizations raises serious first amendment questions. Although the Su-
preme Court has thus far sidestepped these constitutional issues, it has, in
dicta, attempted to answer them by developing a different type of estab-
lishment clause analysis.3 The essential element of this analysis is an ex-
amination of government entanglement with the religious institutions to be
regulated.
An area in which the theory of regulatory entanglement has received
much attention concerns the assertion of jurisdiction by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) over lay employees of religious institutions, par-
ticularly over lay teachers at parochial schools.4 The purpose of this Note
is to examine the theory of regulatory entanglement in this context, as it
has been set forth in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.' This Note will
conclude that it is incorrect for the Court to use the entanglement test
under the establishment clause to determine the constitutionality of NLRB
jurisdiction in these cases. These issues are better resolved under the free
exercise clause because its balancing test is more appropriate in these
instances.
1. Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985).
2. The rising number of church and state clashes is due to the diversity of religious groups
in the United States and their intermingling religious with business and social welfare activities.
Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organiza-
tions, 41 NVAsH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 365-67 (1984).
3. Marshall & Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment
Clause, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 293, 294-95 (1986).
4. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161.
5. 440 U.S. 490.
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The free exercise clause dictates that the government may not force an
individual to choose between religious beliefs and adherence to the law.
Such a choice arises when a government regulation burdens religiously
dictated behavior, either directly or indirectly, or requires action proscribed
by religious belief.6 However, the right to free exercise of religion, like all
other constitutional guarantees, is not absolute.7 The Supreme Court has
developed a balancing test which it employs when governmental regulation
and religious choice come into conflict. The claimant must make an initial
showing that her religious beliefs are sincere and that the challenged regu-
lation impinges upon the practice of those beliefs. The burden of proof
then shifts to the government, which must show that its interference with
religious freedom is justified by a compelling interest and that the least
restrictive means have been used to achieve that interest. 9
When a religious organization claims that government action violates its
first amendment freedoms it usually does so under the free exercise clause,' 0
However, a religious organization may also use the establishment clause as
a means of fending off government intrusion." Under the establishment
clause the government must show that its regulation has a secular purpose
and a secular effect, and that no excessive entanglement with the religious
institution will result from the questioned governmental action.' 2 A religious
group litigating under the establishment clause will assert that regulatioi of
its activities fosters excessive entanglement and, therefore, an exemption
from the burden should be created. Such cases are classified as regulatory
entanglement claims.' 3
The Supreme Court has not yet utilized the theory of regulatory entan-
glement to invalidate government regulation of a religious group.' 4 However,
in several cases the Court has recognized that regulatory entanglement may
in the future play a large role in creating religion based exemptions from
government intrusion.15
6. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw 1510 (l1th ed. 1985).
7. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
8. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716-18 (1981).
9. Id. at 718. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972), where the Court
stated that "only those interests of the highest order ... can overbalance claims to the free
exercise of religion."
10. Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 3, at 295.
11. L. TRmE, AmRI AN CoNsTrruoNAL LAw, § 14-11, at 1230 (2d ed. 1988).
12. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
13. L. TRME, supra note 11, § 14-11, at 1230.
14. Id.
15. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1978) the Court stated that "[determining
that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or
supporting religion does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end
result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with religion .... Elimination
of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government .. " See also Catholic
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When analyzing a claim under the theory of regulatory entanglement the
Court has indicated that several factors must be taken into consideration.
First, it must be shown that a particular government action poses a serious
risk of first amendment infringement.1 6 Next, the courts should examine the
religious nature of the institution to be regulated, the extent of the govern-
ment intrusion and, finally, the resulting relationship between the religious
institution and the government. 7
I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND PAROCIAL SCHOOLS
In 1926, Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act. 8 The terms of this
Act were agreed upon privately by the railroads and the unions prior to its
passage. The purpose of the Railway Labor Act was to facilitate the peaceful
settlement of labor disputes. Eventually the Act's flaws became apparent
and the need for a more comprehensive plan was recognized in response to
rapidly growing union membership.' 9
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act),
supporting unionization and collective bargaining. 20 The Wagner Act pro-
vided employees with the legally protected right to unionize and to have
their own representatives bargain collectively. 2' The National Labor Relations
Board was created by Congress, using its powers under the commerce clause,
to enforce the Act.22 There were immediate constitutional challenges to the
Wagner Act, and the Supreme Court was quick to respond by upholding
the constitutionality of the Act and the establishment of the NLRB as a
valid exercise of Congress' powers under the commerce clause. 23
The Wagner Act did not exclude parochial schools from its coverage. 24
In fact, all private nonprofit organizations were subject to the Act. 25 It is
Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502 (where the Court stated that "[g]ood intentions by government...
can surely no more avoid entanglement with the religious mission of the school . . . " and
thus implied that NLRB regulation of parochial school teachers would violate the entanglement
prong of the establishment clause.)
16. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
17. Esbeck, supra note 2, at 352.
18. D. BoK, A. Cox & R. GoRmAN, CAsEs AND MATERI s ON LABOR LAW 79 (10th ed.
1986) [hereinafter LABOR LAW].
19. Id. at 79-82.
20. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
21. LABOR LAw, supra note 18, at 83. Section 7 of the Wagner Act provides that
"[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purbose of collectively bargaining or other mutual ald or protection."
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
22. LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 84.
23. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
24. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chidago, 440 U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
25. Id. at 512.
101719891
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
important to note that the Act was specific in its definition of an employer
and those who were exempt from such classification. 26 However, even though
the NLRB had jurisdiction over parochial schools in 1935, there was no
real reason for it to assert that jurisdiction. Such schools had little impact
on interstate commerce and eighty-eight percent of those teaching in these
institutions were nuns or priests, not members of the secular work force. 27
National labor policy continued to be governed by the Wagner Act until
1947. During that time the unions grew rapidly and became very powerful.2
That the unions had become so powerful so quickly began to cause concern
among the public, and an anti-union attitude developed. In response to this
shift in public sentiment, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act).29 Organized labor was vehemently opposed
to the passage of this statute, which reflected a retraction of the govern-
ment's union support. The Taft-Hartley Act extended the role of the law
in resolving labor disputesA0
The Taft-Hartley Act, like the Wagner Act, did not specifically exempt
parochial schools from its coverage. In fact, an exemption for religious and
educational institutions was considered but never adopted." However, an
exemption from NLRB jurisdiction was created for nonprofit hospitals.32
The passage of such a limited exception to NLRB jurisdiction seems to
reflect an intent by Congress to subject all other nonprofit employers to
the Act, perhaps in response to their increased involvement in interstate
commerce.
The NLRB continued to have jurisdiction over nonprofit educational
institutions, but it apparently did not exercise that jurisdiction. Then, in
1951, the Board stated that it would not exercise its jurisdiction over these
26. The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political
subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act .... as
amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting
as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (original version at 49 Stat. 449
(1935)) (emphasis added).
27. Comment, Labor Relations in Parochial Schools: Should Lay Teachers Be Denied
Protection of the General Laws?, 17 SAN Dmo L. Rv. 1093, 1096-97 (1980).
28. See LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 90.
29. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
30. LABOR LAW, supra note 18, at 89-92.
31. The original House version of the Taft-Hartley Act would have provided that the
"term 'employer' . . . shall not include . . . any . . . foundation organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literdry, or educational purposes." H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1947), reprinted in NLRB, LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF Tim LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 158, 160-61 (1948).
32. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1947), reprinted in NRLB, LEGIsLATrvE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947, at 226, 229 (1948).
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schools. 3 The decision to exempt these schools from the Act's coverage was
declared an exercise of the Board's discretion. The NLRB wanted no
confusion as to the fact that a parochial school's conducting of business
was subject to the Act. But at that particular time the Board felt it was
inappropriate to exercise jurisdiction.3 4 It is interesting to note that the
NLRB soon cautiously extended this exemption to secondary parochial
schools. It seems as if the Board was aware that it might be treading on
thin entanglement ice, especially since these institutions now had a growing
impact on interstate commerce.
As time passed more lay teachers joined the parochial school work force.35
This influx of lay teachers into the parochial school system also had the
effect of further increasing these institutions' roles in interstate commerce.3 6
In response to this intrusion into the commercial realm, the NLRB overruled
Trustees of Columbia University in Cornell University.17 The Board decided
that it would exercise its jurisdiction over private, nonprofit secondary
schools.3 8 The NLRB felt that these schools had chosen to enmesh themselves
with the secular world when they hired lay teachers, and therefore, they
should be subject to the same regulation as their secular counterparts. 39
Without statutory protections, lay teachers would remain at the mercy of
these underfunded schools and would not be able to assert their right to
unionization and collective bargaining. 40
It appears that the NLRB was aware that it would be involved with
church affairs. In fact, the Board acknowledged the potential for entangle-
ment. In Cardinal Timothy Manning, Roman Catholic Archbishop of the
Archdiocese of Los Angeles v. NLRB,41 the Board stated that the "[r]egulation
of labor relations does not violate the first amendment when it involves a
minimal intrusion on religious conduct and is necessary to obtain [the Act's]
objective." ' 42 It appears that the NLRB, by placing the Act's objectives
before implicated first amendment interests, felt that it had resolved the
constitutional question which continues to plague the courts today-are
Congress' interests under the commerce clause more important than the
first amendment claims asserted by religious institutions opposed to NLRB
regulation? Indeed, it was this question which the Supreme Court hoped to
put to rest with its decision in Catholic Bishop. However, instead of resolving
33. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951).
34. Id. at 425.
35. See Comment, supra note 27, at 1097.
36. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 497.
37. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
38. Id. at 331.
39. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 498.
40. See Comment, supra note 27, at 1107.
41. 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976).
42. Id. at 1218 (emphasis added).
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the issue, the Court only added to already overwhelming uncertainty.
II. NLRB v. CATHOLIC BISHOP OF CHICAGO
43
In 1979, the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the competing con-
stitutional interests of Congress, acting through its agent the NLRB, and
the Church. 44 Although the Court never officially reached the constitutional
issue, Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the majority made it clear that in
the future the Court would be willing to subordinate Congress' interests in
regulating labor under the commerce clause.4 5 The imposition of NLRB
regulation over collective bargaining at parochial schools would impinge
upon these schools' first amendment freedoms. The Court, in dicta, used
the theory of regulatory entanglement to reach the conclusion that interests
protected by the first amendment should prevail. This analysis, however,
was simply a means for the Court to balance the competing interests of
government against those of the private sector. Such a balancing test is
utilized when examining free exercise claims."6
The case involved two Catholic high schools in Chicago, Quigley Prepar-
atory Seminaries North and South, which were run by the Catholic Bishop
of Chicago. Five high schools operated by the Diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend, Inc. were also involved in the litigation.4 7 The Chicago schools
trained students to become members of the clergy. Their enrollment was
limited to those students who, according to recommendations by their parish
priests, had the potential to complete the necessary training to become a
priest or nun. 4s These schools provided highly specialized religious instruction
in addition to teaching secular college preparatory courses. The schools
operated by the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., however, only
sought to providetheir students with a secular education which included
religious training and teaching adherence to the tenets of the Catholic
Church.4
9
In 1974 and 1975 lay teachers from both school systems sought union
representation. The NLRB ordered representation elections.50 Despite com-
plaints by school officials that their first amendment rights were being
43. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 499.
46. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
47. Both school systems operated with the approval of their respective states, Illinois and
Indiana. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S at 492-93.
48. Id. at 492.
49. Id. at 493.
50. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 360 (1975), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1112, aff'd
440 U.S. 490 (1979). It is important to note that the petitions asked for representation of only
lay teachers and excluded all other employees of these schools.
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violated, representatives were elected and the Board certified them to act
as exclusive bargaining agents for the teachers.5 ' In response to the Board's
rejection of their first amendment claims, the schools refused to bargain
with the union.5 2 The union filed unfair labor practice complaints with the
NLRB and moved for summary judgment. Their motion was granted over
continuing assertions by the schools that the first amendment protected
them from the imposition of Board jurisdiction. 53 The Board ordered that
bargaining commence immediately.
The schools continued to ignore the Board's order and filed with the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for review of the Board's decision . 4 The
schools were successful in arguing their first amendment claims and the
court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's orders. The court of
appeals recognized that church schools were employers as contemplated by
the Wagner Act, but declared that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over
these schools was unconstitutional.5 5 The NLRB's actions were found to
violate the establishment clause because they would foster excessive entan-
glement.
The court of appeals did not accept the NLRB's contentions that it could
avoid entanglement by resolving only factual issues, such as the motivations
behind the firing of a teacher. The Board conceded this could involve some
inquiry as to whether the school's motivations were religiously dictated. But
the Board argued that after making a motivational determination, it would
only decide cases where the commission of unfair labor practices was for
nonreligious reasons.5 6 The Board said it would not question the validity or
propriety of a religiously dictated dismissal. The NLRB seemed to be saying
that it recognized that its assertion of jurisdiction would affect the operation
of these schools, but that a determination of the constitutionality of the
exercise of this jurisdiction and the extent of the entanglement caused should
be decided on a case by case basis.
Judge Pell, writing for the court of appeals, disagreed and found that
the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction was unconstitutional per se. He stated
that "[T]he whole tenor of the Religion Clauses cases involving state aid
51. The NLRB stated that it was exercising its discretionary powers in determining that it
had jurisdiction to order the elections and to certify the representatives. The Board asserted
that none of the schools was completely religious in nature; therefore, the Board's exercise of
jurisdiction did not violate their first amendment rights. Pfeffer, Unionization of Parochial
School Teachers, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 273, 275-76 (1980).
52. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 494.
53. Id.
54. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S.
490 (1979).
55. Id. at 1115, 1123.
56. Id. at 1125. It is also important to note that once the NLRB finds the existence of an
unfair labor practice, it simply orders the parties to the bargaining table; it cannot compel
them to agree. Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1167 (2d Cir. 1985).
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to schools is that there does not have to be an actual trial run . . . but it
is sufficient to strike the aid down that a reasonable likelihood or possibility
of entanglement exists. "[w]e cannot ignore here the danger that pervasive
modern governmental power will . . . conflict with the Religion Clauses.''S7
The NLRB appealed and the Supreme Couirt granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issue which the court of
appeals had so zealously pursued, Instead, the Court focused on the
construction of the Wagner Act .5 The issue, the Court stated, was whether
there was a clear expression by Congress of an affirmative intention to
include parochial schools within the Board's jurisdiction as dictated by the
Act.5 9 Only after resolving this problem could the constitutional question
be reached. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, found that there
was no such affirmative intention expressed by Congress. The Chief Justice
looked to the language and legislative history of the Wagner Act and
concluded that since there was no specific language designating parochial
schools as employers under the Act, these institutions were not within the
NLRB's jurisdiction 0 In resolving the jurisdictional argument in this manner
the Court admittedly took the easy way out. 6'
A close examination of the Court's opinion, however, reveals that it
misinterpreted the legislative history of the Act. 62 Dissenting Justice Brennan
attacked the majority's analysis in a terse and condescending opinion. It
was not Congress' explicit intent to include parochial schools within the
definition of employer under the Act that mattered, but rather the legisla-
ture's intent to specifically exclude these institutions from Board jurisdiction
that counted. 63 The Act's definition was meant to be general, and where
Congress saw fit to exclude a specific employer from the Act's coverage, it
did so.6 Had Congress felt the need to exclude parochial schools from
Board jurisdiction it could have passed any one of the proposed amendments
to do so. 65 Therefore, according to the dissent, the Court should have
decided the constitutional issue.
Although the Court overruled the Seventh Circuit on statutory grounds,
the majority, in dicta, did agree with the court of appeals' entanglement
57. Catholic Bishop, 559 F.2d at 1126 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620
(1971)).
58. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 490.
59. Id. at 491.
60. Id. at 505.
61. The Court stated that "[wie decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in
turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees
of the First Amendment Religion Clauses." Id. at 507.
62. See supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text, See also Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at
511-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. See Pfeffer, supra note 51, at 277.
64. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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analysis." It distilled the court of appeals' decision and came up with a test
which it would use in the future to determine whether there was sufficient
regulatory entanglement to render government actions unconstitutional.
After making an initial determination that NLRB regulation would foster
a seriois risk of first amendment infringement, the Court looked to the
nature of the schools involved in the litigation. 67 The majority found that
the management of the schools was dictated by religious creed, and that it
was virtually impossible to separate the teaching of religious doctrine from
secular instruction." The reason for this was that the teachers at these
institutions had a unique role. These instructors, aware of the school's
objectives, subjectively conveyed information to the students, thus making
the separation of the religious from the secular very difficult.
An examination of the regulatory action to be taken by the NLRB
followed. After the Board certified the elected bargaining agents, it was
within its powers to resolve unfair labor disputes brought to its attention.
Once a claim is filed with the Board, an investigation into the facts
surrounding the claim is conducted. Many of these factual investigations
would center on the issue of whether a teacher was discharged for violating
the religious creed of a school or for anti-union reasons.69
It was this type of investigation which bothered the Court the most. The
majority was unable to see how the NLRB could avoid excessive entangle-
ment in these situations. An inquiry into the reasons behind a discharge
would require the Board to ascertain whether or not there was a good faith
basis behind a school's religiously dictated dismissal.70 Taking the analysis
even further, the Court found that the actual process of electing and
certifying the bargaining agents would violate the school's first amendment
freedoms. As the Court stated, "It is not only the conclusions that may be
reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by Religion
Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and
conclusions." '7'
Thus, by determining that the nature of the NLRB regulation was
unacceptable, the Court, in dicta, also concluded that the resulting rela-
tionship between the church-operated schools and the Board could not be
tolerated under the first amendment. In light of the special nature of the
church-teacher relationship at these schools, any NLRB regulation would
66. "We see no escape from conflicts flowing from the Board's exercise of jurisdiction
over teachers in Church operated schools and the consequent serious First Amendment questions
that would follow." Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504.
67. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
68. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501.
69. See Pfeffer, supra note 51, at 290.
70. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
71. Id. at 502 (footnote omitted).
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result in the Board's stifling the objectives of the schools' managementY2
The Board, by asserting its jurisdiction, would be opening a pandora's box
of conflicts between itself and the clergy/administrators.
Thus, the Supreme Court, by not deciding but discussing the constitutional
issue, structured a test for regulatory entanglement which lower courts have
usepI as a not-so-helpful guide for resplving similar cases.73 These courts
seem to recognize the inherent flaw in the Court's entanglement analysis:
that the balancing test of the free exercise clause is much better suited to
handle cases concerning government regulation of religious institutions.
Lower courts also seem to realize what is really at stake in these cases are
two competing constitutional interests, and this is why they prefer a free
exercise interest balancing analysis.
III. WHY THE REGULATORY ENTANGLEMENT ANALYSIS Is
INAPPROPRIATE
The Catholic Bishop Court, instead of looking for potential entanglement,
should have balanced the Board's interest in regulating commerce through
uniformly applied labor laws against the parochial schools' interest in
autonomy. 74 When conducting this free exercise inquiry the Court should
have considered whether a religious exemption from NLRB regulation would
hinder the Board's goal. If the Court had reached the constitutional issue
and utilized the free exercise analysis, the Justices could have ruled that the
exercise of such jurisdiction was constitutional.
An example of the free exercise analysis which the Catholic Bishop Court
should have used is found in United States v. Lee.75 In this case the Supreme
Court rejected a claim by the Amish that they should be exempt from the
payment of Social Security taxes. The Court emphasized the fact that not
all burdens on religion are unconstitutional, 76 and set out what it felt was
a proper analysis. First, a court should inquire into whether a government
regulation would burden the free exercise right of the complaining party.77
Next, it must be determined whether the state has shown that its interest
in regulating the religious institution is compelling enough to overcome the
free exercise claim. 7 And finally, the court must ask whether the creatiorn
of an exemption for this religious entity would interfere with the stated
governmental interest. 79
72. Id. at 504.
73. See Marshall & Blorngren, supra note 3, at 303.
74. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
75. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
76. Id. at 257.
77. Id. at 256-57.
78. Id. at 257-58.
79. Id. at 259.
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In Lee the Court emphasized the importance of the Social Security
program as a whole and the necessity for uniform participation in that
program. The government's compelling interest in collecting taxes was
stressed. The Court concluded that the government's interest in collecting
taxes was superior to the Amish interests in exemption. 0 According to the
Court, the entire Social Security program would have been jeopardized had
the Court permitted an accommodation for the Amish. By permitting an
exception for the Amish the Court would have opened the floodgates to
similar claims and accommodations.
The facts of Catholic Bishop present similar concerns. The Board's interest
in providing employees with a uniformly applied labor policy, giving them
the right to reap the benefits of collective bargaining, should override the
parochial schools' interests in autonomy. The Board's uniform regulation
of labor solves a national problem, just as uniform participation in the
Spcial Security program does. Without NLRB regulation employees would
be at the mercy of their employers. The government would like to avoid
this scenario because the goal of the NLRA is to promote nationwide
industrial peace. That a religious institution should be able to overcome
such a compelling national interest by claiming that it may be somewhat
burdened seems extreme. The NLRB has made efforts to tailor its regulation
so as to burden the schools' management as little as possible."1 These efforts
should have been taken more seriously by the Catholic Bishop Court.
The Lee Court combined a broadly defined compelling state interest with
a least restrictive means test and came up with the result that should have
been reached by the Court in Catholic Bishop. There is a need for accom-
modation, but this need must be tempered by a "more focused and less
restrictive inquiry than Lemon's ... ."s2 Part of the reason a more directed
analysis is necessary in these cases centers around the word "establishment"
itself. The word connotes support of religion. 3 Actions by the government
which aid or benefit religion are considered subject to establishment clause
limitatiops. 4 Regulation, however, implies restriction, and government ac-
tions which restrict the activity of a religious entity are deemed subject to
a free exercise inquiry. 5 When the government seeks to regulate a religious
institution, its goal is not to promote that group over a secular entity
providing the same services. Nor does the government intend to inhibit that
group's religious practices, although that may be one of the effects of such
80. Jd. at 260.
81. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
82. Developments in the Law: Religion and the State, 100 HA v. L. REv. 1606, 1732
(1987).
83. Marshall & Blorgren, supra note 3, at 306.
84. See id. at P06-07.
85. Id.
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restrictions. To take an issue best resolved under the free exercise clause
and subject it to regulatory entanglement criteria is illogical. The Lemon
test would have to be changed drastically in order to accommodate regu-
latory entanglement. 6
Another reason why the regulatory entanglement theory is inappropriate
concerns the expansiveness of corporate religion today. Religious institutions
have expanded their roles as spiritual advisors and educators to that of
business executives. These entities now handle the same services in church-
operated facilities that are provided by state health and social service
agencies.87 The financial and commercial growth of religious groups should
not be allowed to run unchecked, and employees of these institutions should
also be protected. Religious institutions have chosen to integrate themselves
into the commercial world and should be made to face up to the conse-
quences of their actions." Fairness to their secular counterparts dictates
such a conclusion. The regulatory establishment theory places an almost
insurmountable burden on the government which it must overcome before
the regulation of a religious entity will be sustained. To tailor a regulation
so that a government agency's contact with a religious group is virtually
nonexistent is impossible. Even if it could be done, the effect of the
regulation would be greatly diminished because the government's ability to
enforce its terms will have been taken away. A free exercise analysis, on
the other hand, tends to even the field. By balancing the interests of the
government against the interests of religious groups, it prevents a religious
group from turning every regulation, no matter how tailored and unobtru-
sive, into a constitutional battle. 9
The use of regulatory entanglement also gives rise to a true establishment
clause concern regarding favoritism. By enforcing the theory of regulatory
entanglement and thus creating religious exemptions, the Court would be
warranting the promotion of religious over secular institutions engaged in
the same practices. 90 This is exactly the effect that Congress wanted to
avoid. Thus, it never explicitly exempted religious institutions from the
NLRA's definition of employer.91 It is ironic that by intending to avoid
establishment clause concerns the theory of regulatory entanglement actually
fosters them.
86. See generally Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U.L. REv. 391 (1987).
87. See Marshall & Blorngren, supra note 3, at 317.
88. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 498, for support of this conclusion.
89. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 3, at 321. The authors state that "[t]he
establishment clause represents one of the few areas of constitutional litigation in which a
challenged regulation cannot be upheld even if supported by a compelling state interest. ...
[T]o conclude that a government regulation implicates establishment clause concerns renders
it per se unconstitutional." Id.
90. Id. at 324.
91. See supra notes 26 & 31 and accompanying text.
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A final problem with the regulatory entanglement theory is that it provides
for a blanket exemption where one is not necessary. NLRB jurisdiction over
employees of parochial schools should not be unconstitutional per se. The
constitutionality of Board action should be considered on a case by case
basis, because this is the only way to determine if a constitutional issue
really exists.
Catholic High School Association v. Culvert92 supports the idea that the
free exercise clause is the appropriate basis for the constitutional inquiry
into the validity of NLRB actions. It also exemplifies the tendency.of the
lower courts to distinguish away the Catholic Bishop dicta on regulatory
entanglement.
The facts of Culvert are almost identical to those in Catholic Bishop.
The New York State Labor Relations Board (N.Y.S.L.R.B.) administers the
New York State Labor Relations Act. 93 The Act specifically subjects the
employees of religious institutions to the jurisdiction of the N.Y.S.L.R.B.Y
In 1969, the Catholic High School Association assisted the Union in electing
bargaining representatives for the lay teachers. Both parties agreed that the
schools covered by the Act were church operated. 95 For the next ten years
the Association and the Union bargained collectively, but specifically ex-
cluded religiousfaculty from the process.6 During this time the Association
never challenged the N.Y.S.L.R.B.'s jurisdiction.
In 1980, a new contract was negotiated and 226 teachers were suspended
for protesting a new substitution policy.Y The Union filed unfair labor
practice petitions. The N.Y.S.L.R.B. investigated and issued a formal com-
plaint. The Association claimed that the N.Y.S.L.R.B.'s actions violated its
first amendment freedoms and filed with the district court a motion for
summary judgment. 98 The motion was granted on establishment clause
grounds and the N.Y.S.L.R.B. appealed. 99
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the
first amendment did not preclude the N.Y.S.L.R.B. from exercising its
jurisdiction. The court followed the entanglement analysis and came to the
conclusion that excessive entanglement does not arise out of the duty to
92. 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 1163.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1164.
99. In an opinion written by Judge Lasker, the district court found a clear intent to subject
the Association to the N.Y.S.L.R.B.'s jurisdiction. It then determined that the application of
the New York State Labor Relations Act to lay teachers was violative of the establishment
clause "because it 'threatens to produce excessive entanglement between church and state.' "
Id. (quoting Catholic High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 573.F. Supp. 1550, 1556 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
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bargain.0c Instead, it held that the existence of establishment clause viola-
tions should be determined on a case by case basis, and that to rule that
an exercise of the N.Y.S.L.R.B.'s jurisdiction was unconstitutional per se
would be jumping the gun.'0' Courts should not speculate, but should wait
until the issue is ripe for resolution.
The court found that the N.Y.S.L.R.B.'s means of inquiry into labor
disputes at parochial schools were well-tailored and fostered only a minimal
burden on religion. The N.Y.S.L.R.B.'s use of a dual motive analysis in
determining whether it would look further into a questionable discharge
proved helpful. 0 2 The N.Y.S.L.R.B. would inquire whether a teacher would
have been fired but for religious reasons; if the answer was no, the
investigation would cease. 0 3
The court of appeals, in constructing its decision, relied upon the bal-
ancing test set forth in Lee, using free exercise analysis rather than regulatory
entanglement." 4 The appellate court found that the burden was on the
Association to overcome the compelling state interest in preserving industrial
peace and economic order. 0 5 Since the Catholic Church did not argue that
collective bargaining was contrary to its beliefs, the burden placed upon
these schools was minimal in comparison to the magnitude of the state
interest.'0 It also appears that the court of appeals was reluctant to grant
the Association a religious exemption because it had bargained with the
Union for ten years without a complaint. 0 7 To permit the Association to
say that its first amendment rights were being infringed upon when it had
remained silent for so long would be unjust. The Association should not
be allowed to take advantage of the benefits provided by collective bar-
gaining and the terms of the N.Y.S.L.R.A. and then have the Board's
actions declared unconstitutional simply for the sake of convenience.
CONCLUSION
Protection for religious institutions from NLRB regulation should not be
found in the establishment clause. The decision in Catholic Bishop was an
"unwarranted extension of the entanglement concern of parochial school
aid cases."'' 0 Cases involving NLRB regulation of parochial schools are
100. Id. at 1168.
101. Id. at 1169.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra text accompanying note 78.
105. See Culvert, 753 F.2d at 1169.
106. Id. at 1171.
107. The court, in its discussion of the facts, notes that "[flrom 1969 to 1980 the Union
and the Association entered into a series of collective bargaining agreements" and that "until
now it has never challenged the Board's jurisdiction." Id. at 1163.
108. Lupu, supra note 86, at 412.
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limited to particular transactions.' 9 In these cases, NLRB action is aimed
at restricting these schools' activities, not promoting one religion's parochial
school over another secular or sectarian one. Thus, the regulatory entan-
glement-establishment clause analysis utilized by the Supreme Court in the
Catholic Bishop case was inappropriate. To regulate is not to establish.
Limitations on government regulation of religious institutions are found
in the free exercise clause. The balancing test dictated by this free exercise
clause is comparatively free from the doctrinal confusion that surrounds
the theory of regulatory entanglement. 10 Instead of requiring a blanket
exemption, a free exercise analysis permits a court to inquire into the means
by which a regulatory agency hopes to achieve its goals. The test recognizes
that some inquiry by the NLRB into the motivations behind a religious
entity's decisions regarding its employees is necessary. This burden on the
religious institution is not unconstitutional entanglement, but rather a means
by which an agency hopes to avoid a constitutional clash."' The free exercise
standard is fact specific, and this type of analysis is needed in order to
satisfactorily resolve situations similar to those in Catholic Bishop and
Culvert.
The problems surrounding the theory of regulatory entanglement cannot
begin to be solved until the Supreme Court officially recognizes that its
dicta in Catholic Bishop was confusing and avoided the real issue. Once
the Court recognizes that what is at stake in these cases are two competing
constitutional interests, it will be well on its way to formulating a more
functional and circumscribed test.' Decisions like those in Lee and Culvert
should be used as models for the Court when it is presented with a case
concerning an issue such as NLRB regulation of parochial schools.
It is obvious that the Court will not have to search for opportunities to
address this problem in the future. One can only hope that when the Court
is presented with such an issue it will not, as it did in Catholic Bishop,
"decline to construe" the matter in a way "that could in turn call upon
the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the
guarantees of the first amendment religion clauses.""12
ELLYN S. RoSEN
109. Id. at 413.
110. See Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 3, at 326.
111. Id. at 327.
112. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).
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